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Improving approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion
games
Alexander Skopalik∗ Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi†
Abstract
Congestion games constitute an important class of games to model resource allocation
by different users. As computing an exact [16] or even an approximate [33] pure Nash
equilibrium is in general PLS-complete, Caragiannis et al. [9] present a polynomial-time al-
gorithm that computes a (2 + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash equilibria for games with linear cost
functions and further results for polynomial cost functions. We show that this factor can be
improved to (1.61+ǫ) and further improved results for polynomial cost functions, by a seem-
ingly simple modification to their algorithm by allowing for the cost functions used during
the best response dynamics be different from the overall objective function. Interestingly,
our modification to the algorithm also extends to efficiently computing improved approxi-
mate pure Nash equilibria in games with arbitrary non-decreasing resource cost functions.
Additionally, our analysis exhibits an interesting method to optimally compute universal
load dependent taxes and using linear programming duality prove tight bounds on PoA
under universal taxation, e.g, 2.012 for linear congestion games and further results for poly-
nomial cost functions. Although our approach yield weaker results than that in Bilo` and
Vinci [6], we remark that our cost functions are locally computable and in contrast to [6]
are independent of the actual instance of the game.
1 Introduction
Congestion games constitute an important class of games that succinctly represents a game
theoretic model for resource allocation among non-cooperative users. A canonical example for
this is the road transportation network, where the time needed to commute is a function on the
total amount of traffic in the network (see e.g. [34]). A congestion game is a cost minimization
game defined by a set of resources E, a set of n players with strategies S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ 2E , and for
each resource e ∈ E, a cost function fe : N 7→ R+. Congestion games were first introduced by
Rosenthal [28] and using a potential function argument proved that it belongs to a class of games
in which a pure Nash equilibrium always exists, i.e., the game always consists of a self-emerging
solution in which no user is able to improve by unilaterally deviating. For a strategy profile
s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn, the cost of a player u ∈ N is defined as cu(s) :=
∑
e∈su
fe(ne(s)), where ne(s)
denotes the number of players on the resource e in the state s. The potential of the game in the
state s is defined as φ(s) :=
∑
e∈E
∑ne(s)
i=1 fe(i).
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Convergence to pure Nash equilibria
Fabrikant et al. [16] show that computing a pure Nash equilibrium in both symmetric and asym-
metric congestion games1 is PLS-complete. They show that regardless of the order in which local
search is performed, there are initial states from where it could take exponential number of the
steps before the game converges to a pure Nash equilibrium. Also, they show PLS-completeness
for network congestion games with asymmetric strategy spaces. As a positive result, Fabrikant
et al. [16] present a polynomial time algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibria in certain
restricted strategy spaces e.g. symmetric network congestion games. Ackermann et al. [1] show
that network congestion games with linear cost functions are PLS-complete. However, if the set
of strategies of each player consists of the bases of a matroid over the set of resources, then they
show that the lengths of all best response sequences are polynomially bounded in the number of
players and resources. This alludes for studying approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion
games.
To our knowledge, the concept of α-approximate equilibria2 was introduced by Roughgarden
and Tardos [29] in the context of non-atomic selfish routing games. An α-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium is a state in which none of the users can unilaterally deviate to improve by
a factor of at least α. Orlin et al. [25] show that every local search problem in PLS admits
a fully polynomial time ǫ-approximation scheme. Although their approach can be applied to
congestion games, this does not yield an approximate pure Nash equilibrium, but rather only
an approximate local optimum of the potential function. In case of congestion games, Skopalik
and Vo¨cking [33] show that in general for arbitrary cost functions, finding a α-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete, for any α > 1. However, for polynomial cost function (with
non-negative coefficients) of maximum degree d, Caragiannis et al. [9] present an approximation
algorithm. They present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes (2 + ǫ)-approximate pure
Nash equilibria for games with linear cost functions and an approximation guarantee of dO(d)
for polynomial cost functions of maximum degree d. Interestingly, they use the convergence of
subsets3 of players to a (1 + ǫ)-approximate Nash equilibrium (of that subset) as a subroutine
to generate a state which is an approximation of the minimal potential function value (of that
subset), e.g., 2 · opt for linear congestion games. This approximation factor of the minimal
potential then essentially turns into the approximation factor of the approximate equilibrium.
Feldotto et al. [17] using a path-cycle decomposition technique bound this approximation factor
of the potential for arbitrary cost functions.
Load Dependent Universal Taxes
The last 20 years saw a significant amount of literature investigating the bound on the price
of anarchy (PoA) [22] for various non-cooperative games and several attempts to improve the
inefficiency of these self-emerging solutions. One of the many approaches used to improve the
PoA is the introduction of taxes [11, 18, 19]. For a set of resources E, the load dependent tax
function t, is the excess cost incurred by the user on a resource e ∈ E with cost f(x), e.g.,
f ′(x) = f(x) + t(x). Meyers and Schulz [24] study the complexity of computing an optimal
solution in a congestion game and prove NP-hardness. Makarychev and Sviridenko [23] give the
best known approximation algorithm using randomized rounding on a natural feasibility LP with
approximation factor Bd+1 which is the d+ 1th Bell number, where d is the maximum degree of
1A congestion game is called symmetric if Si = Sj for all i, j ∈ N . Otherwise it is called asymmetric.
2Here we refer to the multiplicative notion of approximation. There is also a additive variant which is often
denoted by ǫ-Nash.
3This subset is carefully chosen such that convergences in polynomial time is guaranteed.
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the polynomial cost function. Interestingly, the same was later achieved using load dependent
taxes by Bilo` and Vinci [6], where they apply the primal-dual method [4] to upper bound the
PoA under refundable taxation in congestion games. They determine a load specific taxation to
show that the PoA is at most [O(d/log d)]d+1 with respect to ǫ-approximate equilibrium under
refundable taxation. However, we remark that the load dependent taxes computed in [6] aren’t
universal, i.e., they are sensitive to the instance of the game.
Our Contribution
In this paper we improve the approximation guarantee achieved in the computation of approxi-
mate pure Nash equilibrium with the algorithm in Caragiannis et al. [9], using a linear program-
ming approach which generalizes the smoothness condition in Roughgarden [30], to modify the
cost functions that users experience in the algorithm. In Section 3 we present an adaptation of
the algorithm in Caragiannis et al. [9]. Although we only make a seemingly simple modification
to their algorithm, we would like to remark that the analysis is significantly involved and does
not follow immediately from [9], since the sub-game induced by the algorithm with the modified
costs is not a potential game anymore. Table 1 lists the results for resource cost function that
are bounded degree polynomials of maximum degree d.
d Previous Approx. [9, 17] Our Approx. ρd + ǫ
1 2 + ǫ 1.61 + ǫ
2 6 + ǫ 3.35 + ǫ
3 20 + ǫ 8.60 + ǫ
4 111 + ǫ 27.46 + ǫ
5 571 + ǫ 98.14 + ǫ
Table 1: Approximate pure Nash equilibria of congestion games with polynomial cost functions
of degree at most d.
Our main contribution in this paper is presented as Theorem 1, where the factor ρd is listed
in Table 1.
Theorem 1 For every ǫ > 0, the algorithm computes a (ρd+ǫ)-approximate equilibrium for every
congestion game with non-decreasing cost functions that are polynomials of maximum degree d
in a number of steps which is polynomial in the number of players, ρd and 1/ǫ.
Our approach also yields a simple and distributed method to compute load dependent universal
taxes that improves the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games. We remark that the
taxes we consider in Section 4 are refundable and do not contribute to the overall cost of the
game. Table 2 lists our results for price of anarchy (PoA) under refundable taxation for resource
cost functions that are bounded degree polynomials. Bilo` and Vinci [6] present an algorithm
to compute load dependent taxes that improve the price of anarchy e.g., for linear congestion
games from 2.5 to 2. Although our methods yield slightly weaker results, our cost functions
are locally computable and in contrast to [6] are independent of the actual instance of the game.
Furthermore, using linear programming duality we derive a reduction to a selfish scheduling game
on identical machines, which implies a matching lower bound on the approximation factor. We
would like to remark that our results for PoA were achieved independently of that in Paccagnan
et al. [26] by a very similar technique.
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d
PoA without Taxes Optimal Taxes Universal Taxes Ψd
Aland et al. [2] Bilo` and Vinci [6] Local Search w.r.t ζsc
1 2.5 2 2.012
2 9.583 5 5.10
3 41.54 15 15.56
4 267.6 52 65.12
5 1414 203 641.32
Table 2: PoA under taxation in congestion games with polynomial cost functions of degree at
most d.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
A strategic game denoted by the tuple
(N , (Su)u∈N , (cu)u∈N ) consists of a finite set of players
N and for each player u ∈ N , a finite set of strategies Su and a cost function cu : S → R+
mapping a state s ∈ S := S1 × S2 × · · · × SN to the cost of player u ∈ N . A congestion game is
a strategic game that succinctly represents a decentralized resource allocation problem involving
selfish users.
A congestion game denoted by G =
(N , E, (Su)u∈N , (fe)e∈E) consists of a set of N players,
N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, who compete over a set of resources, E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. Each player
u ∈ N has a set of strategies denoted by Su ⊆ 2E. Each resource e ∈ E has a non-negative
and non-decreasing cost function fe : N 7→ R+ associated with it. Let ne(s) denote the number
of players on a resource e ∈ E in the state s, then the cost contributed by a resource e ∈ E to
each player using it is denoted by fe(ne(s)). Therefore, the cost of a player u ∈ N in a state
s = (s1, . . . , sN ) of the game is given by cu(s) =
∑
e∈E:e∈su
fe(ne(s)). For a state s, cu(s
′
u, s−u)
denotes the cost of player u, when only u deviates.
A state s ∈ S is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), if there exists no player who could deviate
to another strategy and decrease their cost, i.e., ∀u ∈ N and ∀s′u ∈ Su, cu(s) ≤ cu(s′u, s−u). A
weaker notion of PNE is the α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium for α ≥ 1, which is a state s
in which no player has an improvement that decreases their cost by a factor of at least α, i.e.,
∀u ∈ N and ∀s′u ∈ Su, α · cu(s′u, s−u) ≥ cu(s). For congestion games the exact potential function
φ(s) =
∑
e∈E φe(ne(s)) =
∑
e∈E
∑ne(s)
i=1 fe(i), guarantees the existence of a PNE by proving that
every sequence of unilateral improving strategies converges to a PNE. We denote social or global
cost of a state s as c(s) =
∑
u∈N cu(s) and the state that minimizes social cost is called the
optimal, i.e., s∗ = argmins∈S c(s). The inefficiency of equilibria is measured using the price of
anarchy (PoA) [22], which is the worst case ratio between the social cost of an equilibrium and
the social optimum.
A local optimum is a state s in which there is no player u ∈ N with an alternative strategy
s′u such that, c(s
′
u, s−u) < c(s) and an α-approximate local optimum is a state s in which there
is no player u who has an α-move with a strategy s′u such that α · c(s′u, s−u) < c(s). Let us
remark that there is an interesting connection between a local optimum and a PNE. A PNE is a
local optimum of the potential function φ and similarly, a local optimum is a Nash equilibrium
of a game in which we change the resource cost functions from f(x) to the marginal contribution
to social cost, e.g., to f ′(x) = xf(x) − (x − 1)f(x − 1). Analogous to the PoA, the stretch
of a congestion game is the worst case ratio between the value of the potential function at an
equilibrium and the potential minimizer [9].
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2.1 Revisiting (λ, µ)-smoothness
After a long series of papers in which various authors (e.g. [12, 3, 2]) show upper bounds on the
price of anarchy, Roughgarden exhibited that most of them essentially used the same technique,
which is formalized as (λ, µ)-smoothness [30]. A game is called (λ, µ)-smooth, if for every pair of
outcomes s, s∗, it holds that, ∑
u∈N
cu(s
∗
u, s−u) ≤ λ · c(s∗) + µ · c(s). (1)
The price of anarchy of a (λ, µ)-smooth game with λ > 0 and µ < 1 is then at most λ1−µ . Observe
that the original smoothness definition (1) can be extended to allow for an arbitrary objective
function h(s) instead of the social cost function c(s) =
∑
u∈N cu(s).
Definition 1 A game is (λ, µ)-smooth with respect to an objective function h, if for every pair
of outcome s, s∗,
λ · h(s∗) ≥
∑
u∈N
cu(s
∗
u, s−u)−
∑
u∈N
cu(s) + (1− µ)h(s).
From the definition above, we restate the central smoothness theorem [30].
Theorem 2 Given a (λ, µ)-smooth game G with λ > 0, µ < 1, and an objective function h, then
for every equilibrium s and the global optimum s∗,
h(s) ≤ λ
1− µh(s
∗).
The smoothness framework introduced by Roughgarden [30] also extends to equilibrium concepts
such as mixed Nash4 and (coarse5) correlated equilibria6. The same is true for our variant with
respect to an arbitrary objective function h. For the sake of completeness a rework can be found
in the Appendix A.
From Definition 1 we note the following observation.
Observation 3 Every (λ, µ)-smooth game G with λ > 0 and µ < 1, is also ( λ1−µ , 0)-smooth with
its cost functions scaled by a factor 11−µ .
Given a strategic game G =
(N , (Su)u∈N , (cu)u∈N ), one can determine λ and µ that satisfies
the smoothness condition in Definition 1, for all pairs of solution s, s∗. However, since the state
space S grows exponentially in the number of players, this would be computationally inefficient.
Therefore, we typically have to work with games in which the players’ costs and the objective
function h can be represented in a succinct way. In congestion games, the players cost and the
global objective function are implicitly defined by the resource cost function. In the following, we
allow for an arbitrary, additive objective function h(s), i.e., of the form h(s) =
∑
e∈E he(ne(s)).
4In a mixed Nash equilibrium (σ1, . . . , σN ) each player u chooses a probability distribution σu of his set of
strategies and ∀u ∈ N , and ∀σ′i, cu(s) ≤ cu(s
′
u, s−u), where cu denotes expected cost of player u.
5 A probability distribution σ over the set of states S is said to be an coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) is
if ∀s, s∗ ∈ S,∀u ∈ N , Es∼σ [cu(s)] ≤ Es∼σ [cu(s∗u, s−u)].
6 A probability distribution σ over the set of states S is said to be an correlated equilibrium if for every player
i ∈ N and every two strategies sa, sb ∈ Si and every recommendation s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∼ σ, the expected cost for
following the recommendation su = sa is not greater that choosing sb instead.
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We study games in which we change the cost functions cu experienced by the players. As a
consequence of Observation 3 and scaling the cost functions appropriately, we can always ensure
that we satisfy the smoothness inequality with µ = 0, to conveniently restate the smoothness
condition as follows.
Lemma 4 A congestion game is (λ, 0)-smooth with respect to an objective function h(s) =∑
e∈E he(ne(s)), if for every cost function f
′
e : N 7→ R+ and for every 0 ≤ n,m ≤ N,
λ · he(m) ≥ mf ′e (n+ 1)− nf ′e(n) + he(n).
The proof in the Appendix A follows from summing the inequality of the lemma with m =
ne(s
∗) and n = ne(s) for two arbitrary solutions s and s
∗, for all e ∈ E. From now on, we use
f ′ = (f ′e)e∈E whenever we refer to the modified cost functions and denote the players cost by
c′u(s) =
∑
e∈su
f ′e(ne(s)).
Strong smoothness
In Section 3 we present an algorithm to compute an approximate pure Nash equilibria with an
improved approximation guarantee than that in Caragiannis et al. [9] and the proof of which uses
the potential function argument for a subset of players F ⊆ N . In particular, it needs the property
that the subgame induced by every subset of players from N is (λ, 0)-smooth. Unfortunately,
Lemma 4 does not guarantee this property. Therefore, we define a stronger notion of (λ, 0)-
smoothness that guarantees that the smoothness condition also holds for an arbitrary subset of
players and its induced subgame.
Let us denote by nFe (s) the number of players in F that use the resource e in the state s.
Definition 2 A strategic game is strongly (λ, 0)-smooth with respect to an objective function h
and for some λ > 0, if for every subset F ⊆ N and for every s, s∗ ∈ S,
λ · hF (s∗) ≥
∑
u∈F
c′u(s
∗
u, s−u)−
∑
u∈F
c′u(s) + h
F (s),
where hF (s) :=
∑
e∈E he(ne(s))− he(nN\Fe (s)).
Now consider an arbitrary subset of players F ⊆ N and a state s. Let us define the
potential of this subset as the potential in the subgame induced by these players in s, i.e.,
φF (s) :=
∑nFe (s)
i=1 fe(i + n
N\F
e (s)). With slight abuse of notation, we remark that φF (s) and
φF (s) are equivalent. Then, G
F
s := (F,E, (Su)u∈F , (f
F
e )e∈E) is the subgame induced by freezing
the remaining players from N \F , with fFe (x) := fe(x+nN\Fe (s)), where nN\Fe (s) is the number
of players outside of F on resource e in the state s. Then, the following lemma gives a stronger
notion of the (λ, 0)-smoothness condition.
Lemma 5 For every congestion game G with cost functions f ′e : N 7→ R+, which is (λ, 0)-smooth
with respect to the potential function φe for every subgame G
F
s induced by an arbitrary subset
F ⊆ N , and arbitrary states s, s∗ ∈ S, i.e.,
λ · φFe (s∗)− nFe (s∗) · f ′e(ne(s) + 1) + nFe (s) · f ′e(ne(s)) ≥ φFe (s),
is also strongly (λ, 0)-smooth.
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The proof of the lemma is shifted to the Appendix A. This subset property is of particular
importance for the algorithm we present in Section 3 to compute an approximate equilibrium,
but may be of independent interest as well. We are not aware of other approximation algorithms
that can guarantee this property as well. We would like to remark that all references to (λ, 0)-
smoothness in Section 3 imply strong (λ, 0)-smoothness.
3 Approximate Equilibria in Congestion Games
In this section we aim at improving the approximation factor of an approximate pure Nash
equilibria in congestion games with arbitrary non-decreasing resource cost functions. We extend
an algorithm based on Caragiannis et al. [9] to compute an approximate pure Nash equilibrium
in congestion games with arbitrary non-decreasing resource cost functions. A key element of this
algorithm is the so called stretch of a (sub-) game. This is the worst case ratio of the potential
function at an equilibrium and the global minimum of the potential.
This algorithm generates a sequence of improving moves that converges to an approximate
pure Nash equilibrium in polynomial number of best-response moves. The idea is to divide the
players into blocks based on their costs and hence their prospective ability to drop the potential
of the game. In each phase of the algorithm, players of two consecutive blocks are scheduled
to make improving moves starting with the blocks of players with high costs. One block only
makes q-moves, which are improvements by a factor of at least q which is close to 1. The other
block does p-moves, where p is slightly larger than the stretch of a q-approximate equilibrium
and slightly smaller than the final approximation factor.
The key idea here is that blocks first converge to a q-approximate equilibrium and thereby
generate a state with a stretch of approximately p. Later, when players of a block are allowed to
do p-moves, there is not much potential left to move. In particular, there is no significant influence
on players of blocks that moved earlier possible. This finally results in the approximation factor
of roughly p. We modify the algorithm in [9] by changing the costs seen by the players during
their q-moves to be a set of modified cost functions (f ′e)e∈E , satisfying smoothness condition
of Lemma 5 for some constant λ > 0, and this results in a λ(1 + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash
equilibrium. Note that, λ is the stretch with respect to the modified cost functions. For the sake
of completeness we present the algorithm as Algorithm 1, but note that only the definition of
θ(q) using λ, the definition of p in Line 1, and the use of the modified cost functions (f ′e)e∈E in
Line 11 has been changed.
3.1 Analysis of the Algorithm
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1, by restating it as follows. The proof of the theorem
follows the proof scheme of Caragiannis et al. [9], which we have to rework to accommodate for
our modifications stated above.
Theorem 6 For every constant ǫ > 0 and every set of cost functions (f ′e)e∈E which are strongly
(λ, 0)-smooth with respect to φ(s), Algorithm 1 computes a λ (1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibrium for
every congestion game with non-decreasing cost functions, in number of steps which is polynomial
in the number of players, ∆ := f(N)
f(1) , λ, and 1/ǫ.
Proof: The algorithm partitions the players into blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bzˆ such that, a player
u ∈ Bi ⇔ ℓu ∈ (bi+1, bi] ,
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Algorithm 1 Computing a λ(1 + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games.
Input: Congestion game G =
(N , E, (Su)u∈N , (fe)e∈E), f ′ := (f ′e)e∈E and ǫ > 0.
Output: A state of G in λ(1 + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
1: Set q =
(
1 + 1
Nc
)
, p =
(
1
θ(q) − 1+q+2λNc
)−1
, c = 10 log
(
λ
ǫ
)
, ∆ = maxe∈E
fe(N)
fe(1)
and θ(q) =
λ
1+ 1−q
q
Nλ
, where λ := min{λ′ ∈ R+ : λ′ satisfies Lemma 5 with respect to (f ′e)e∈E}.
2: foreach u ∈ N do
3: set ℓu = cu (BRu (0));
4: end for
5: Set ℓmin = minu∈N ℓu , ℓmax = maxu∈N ℓu and zˆ = 1 + ⌈log2∆N2c+2 (ℓmax/ℓmin)⌉;
6: Assign players to blocks B1, B2, · · · , Bzˆ such that
u ∈ Bi ⇔ ℓu ∈
(
ℓmax
(
2∆N2c+2
)−i
, ℓmax
(
2∆N2c+2
)−i+1]
;
7: foreach u ∈ N do
8: set the player u to play the strategy su ← BRu (0);
9: end for
10: for phase i← 1 to zˆ − 1 such that Bi 6= ∅ do
11: while ∃u ∈ Bi with a p-move w.r.t the original cost f or ∃u ∈ Bi+1 with a q-move w.r.t
to modified cost f ′ do
12: u deviates to that best-response strategy su ← BR (s1, · · · , sn).
13: end while
14: end for
where
bi := ℓmax
(
2∆N2c+2
)−i+1
and bi+1 := ℓmax
(
2∆N2c+2
)−i
define the boundaries of the block Bi. The partitioning is such that, the algorithm partitions
the players to zˆ = 1 + ⌈log2∆N2c+2 (ℓmax/ℓmin)⌉ ≤ N blocks where for any block Bi the ratio
bi/bi+1 = 2∆N
2c+2 and ∆ = maxe∈E
fe(N)
fe(1)
. Note that, for cost functions which are polynomials
of maximum degree d with non negative coefficients, ∆ is polynomial in the number of players.
Next, the algorithm enforces every player u ∈ N to play their optimistic strategy by which they
incur a cost that could be at most ∆bi. This also defines the initial state of the game denoted
by s0, where si denotes the state of the game after the phase i. The sequence of moves in the
game is divided into multiple phases determined by the player blocks. The phases of the game
progresses from 1→ zˆ − 1. During a phase i of the game, only players in the block Bi and Bi+1
make moves. Particularly, players in Bi make their p-move using the original cost function f and
the players in Bi+1 make their q-move, but now using the modified cost function f
′ that satisfies
Lemma 5 for some λ > 0.
For player u ∈ N a deviation to a strategy s′u is called a p-move if cu(s′u, s−u) < cu(s)p . Simi-
larly a q-move with respect to the modified cost functions is defined as a move with c′u(s
′
u, s−u) <
c′u(s)
q
. A phase i is considered to be complete at a state si, if ∀u ∈ Bi, cu(si) ≤ p ·cu(s′u, si−u) i.e.,
the players in Bi are in a p-equilibrium. Similarly, ∀u ∈ Bi+1, c′u(si) ≤ q · c′u(s′u, si−u) i.e., the
players in Bi+1 are in a q-equilibrium w.r.t. the modified cost functions. All the other players
i.e., N \ (Bi ∪ Bi+i) are frozen to their strategy associated with the phase i − 1. Also, note
that players in a block Bi are frozen to their optimistic strategy BRu(0) until phase i− 1. The
players involved during a phase i are denoted by Ri. Now since during the phase i only players
in Ri make their best-response moves, the latency introduced by these players on a particular
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resource of the game will be denoted as fRie . Moreover, since the players N \ Ri are frozen to
their strategy of phase i − 1, the latency incurred by a player u ∈ Ri using a resource e ∈ E
can be expressed as fRie (n
Ri
e (s)) = fe(n
Ri
e (s) + n
N\Ri
e (s)), where nRie (s) denotes the number of
players u ∈ Ri in the state s using the resource e and nN\Rie (s) denotes the number of players
on the resource e in the state s that do not participate in the phase i of the game. Furthermore,
the potential amongst the players in Ri will be denoted as ΦRi .
Here, we have to take into account that the game played by the players from Bi ∪ Bi+1 in
phase i is no longer a potential game as the players use different cost functions. However, we
can show that the strong smoothness condition of Lemma 5 guarantees that the values of the
modified cost functions f ′ can be conveniently bounded.
Lemma 7 Let f ′ to be the set of modified cost functions satisfying strong (λ, 0)-smoothness
condition for some λ > 0 and f to be the original cost functions. Then for all i ≥ 1,
fe(i) ≤ f ′e(i) ≤ λfe(i).
Proof: Using the strong smoothness condition of Lemma 5 and setting n = 0, m = 1, and
z = i− 1 gives,
λfe(i) ≥ f ′e(i).
Furthermore, with m = 0, n = 1, and z = i− 1 we have that,
f ′e(i) ≥ f(i).
To bound the stretch of any (sub-) game in a q-approximate equilibrium the following lemma
is useful. In its proof we handle the modified cost functions which then leads to value of θ(q) :=
λ
1+Nλ 1−q
q
(cf. Algorithm 1) that depends on the stretch λ of the modified cost functions, instead
of the original ones. We remark that for this lemma, the property that the induced subgames
are also smooth (Lemma 5) is crucial.
Lemma 8 Let s be any q-approximate equilibrium with respect to the modified cost function and
s∗ be a strategy profile with minimal potential. Then for every F ⊆ N , φF (s) ≤ θ(q) · φF (s∗).
Proof: Let c′u and cu denote the cost of a player u ∈ F using the modified cost function f ′
and the original cost function f , respectively. From the definition of q-approximate equilibrium
we have that,
c′u(s) ≤ q · c′u(s∗u, s−u).
Then, using Lemma 7,
c′u(s
∗
u, s−u)− c′u(s) ≥
1− q
q
c′u(s) ≥
1− q
q
λcu(s) ≥ 1− q
q
λΦF (s),
summing the above inequality for all players u ∈ F gives,∑
u∈F
(c′u(s
∗
u, s−u)− c′u(s)) ≥
1− q
q
NλΦF (s). (2)
Then, by the smoothness condition of Lemma 5 and (2) we have,
ΦF (s) ≤ λ · ΦF (s∗)−
(∑
u∈F
(c′u(s
∗
u, s−u)− c′u(s))
)
9
≤ λ · ΦF (s∗)− 1− q
q
NλΦF (s).(
1 +
1− q
q
Nλ
)
ΦF (s) ≤ λ · ΦF (s∗)
ΦF (s) ≤ λ
1 + 1−q
q
Nλ
· ΦF (s∗). (3)
Setting θ(q) = λ
1+Nλ· 1−q
q
in (3) concludes the proof.
Claim 9 (Caragiannis et al. [9]) For any state s of a congestion game with a set of players
N , a set of resource E and latency functions (fe)e∈E, it holds that∑
e∈E
fe(ne(s)) ≤ φ(s) ≤
∑
u∈N
cu(s).
Lemma 10 (Caragiannis et al. [9]) Let s be a state of the congestion game G with a set of
players N and let F ⊆ N . Then, φ(s) ≤ φF (s) + φN\F and φ(s) ≥ φF (s).
Lemma 11 (Caragiannis et al. [9]) Let c(u) denote the cost of player u ∈ Ri just after mak-
ing his last move within phase i. Then,
φRi(s
i) ≤
∑
u∈Ri
c(u).
We now bound the potential of the set of players Ri ⊆ Bi ∪ Bi+1 that move in phase i. Most
importantly, the players of Bi, were in an q-approximate equilibrium with respect to c
′
u at the end
of the previous round. Hence, for every subset of Bi, we can exploit Lemma 8 to obtain a small
upper bound on the potential amongst players Ri participating in a phase i at the beginning of
the phase. Recall that for a phase i, bi := ℓmax
(
2∆N2c+2
)−i+1
and si denotes the state of the
game after the execution of phase i.
Lemma 12 For every phase i ≥ 2, it holds that φRi(si−1) ≤ biNc .
Proof: Let us assume that inequality does not hold and φRi(s
i−1) > bi
Nc
. Then, we show
that the players u ∈ Ri ∩ Bi were not in a q-approximate equilibrium w.r.t. the modified cost
functions f ′ in the phase i− 1 and thus violating the dynamics of the algorithm.
Note that the players in the block Bi+1 have not moved until the phase i− 1 and are in their
optimistic strategy BRu(0) as per the initial settings of the algorithm. As per the definition of
blocks the cost incurred by a player u ∈ Bi+1 is at most ∆bi+1. So the total cost incurred by all
the players in Ri ∩ Bi+1, i.e.,
∑
u∈Ri∩Bi+1
∆bi+1 ≤ N∆bi+1. The potential amongst players in
Ri ∩Bi+1 is bounded by,
ΦRi∩Bi+1(s
i−1) ≤ N∆bi+1. (4)
Using Lemma 10, (4), and our assumption on ΦRi(s
i−1) we get,
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1) ≥ ΦRi(si−1)− ΦRi∩Bi+1(si−1)
>
bi
N c
−N∆bi+1
10
=(
2∆N2c+2
N c
−N∆
)
bi+1
≥ N c+1∆bi+1. (5)
Let us denote by c(u) the latency of a player u ∈ Ri ∩Bi after he made his last move during
the phase i. So, the change in potential contributed by the player u in the phase i is at least
(p−1)c(u). Let us denote by ξi the decrease of potential due to the moves of the players in Bi+1 in
phase i. Note that ξi could be negative as the players of Bi+1 use the modified cost functions. The
change in potential due to the moves by all the players in Ri is given by (p−1)
∑
u∈Ri∩Bi
c(u)+ξi
and we can bound
(p− 1)
∑
u∈Ri∩Bi
c(u)
≤ ΦRi(si−1)− ΦRi(si)− ξi
≤ ΦRi∩Bi(si−1) + ΦRi∩Bi+1(si−1)− ΦRi(si)− ξi
≤ ΦRi∩Bi(si−1) +N∆bi+1 − ΦRi(si)− ξi
<
(
1 +
1
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)− ΦRi(si)− ξi. (6)
To account in the change of potential ξi from s
i−1 to si due the players in Bi+1, we observe
that the latency of a player u ∈ Ri ∩ Bi+1 was at most cu(si−1) ≤ ∆bi+1 as he was put by the
algorithm on BR(0). By Lemma 7, his cost with respect to the modified cost function on this
strategy are c′u(s
i−1) ≤ λ∆bi+1. Since, he may always switch back to this strategy, his cost in si
can be bounded by
cu(s
i) ≤ c′u(si) < qλ∆bi+1.
This yields a bound on the change of the potential of
ξi > −qNλ∆bi+1.
Now we can bound the potential in si by the latency of the players. We then can use inequality
(6) for the players in Ri ∩Bi. By Lemma 7, the latency of a player u ∈ Ri ∩Bi+1 after he made
his last q-move during the phase i is at most λ∆bi+1.
ΦRi(s
i) ≤
∑
u∈Ri
c(u)
=
∑
u∈Ri∩Bi+1
c(u) +
∑
u∈Ri∩Bi
c(u)
< Nλ∆bi+1 +
1
p− 1
(
1 +
1
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
− 1
p− 1ΦRi(s
i)− 1
p− 1ξi
≤ λ
N c
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1) +
1
p− 1
(
1 +
1
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
− 1
p− 1ΦRi(s
i) +
q
p− 1Nλ∆bi+1
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≤ λ
N c
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1) +
1
p− 1
(
1 +
1
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
− 1
p− 1ΦRi(s
i) +
q
p− 1
λ
N c
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
≤ λ(p− 1)
(p− 1)N cΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1) +
1
p− 1
(
1 +
1
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
− 1
p− 1ΦRi(s
i) +
q
p− 1
λ
N c
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
≤ 1
p− 1
(
1 +
(p− 1)λ+ 1+ qλ
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
− 1
p− 1ΦRi(s
i)
equivalent to,
p
p− 1ΦRi(s
i) <
1
p− 1
(
1 +
(p− 1)λ+ 1 + qλ
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
=
p
p− 1
(
1
p
+
(p− 1)λ+ 1 + qλ
pN c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
<
p
p− 1
(
1
p
+
λ
N c
+
1 + qλ
pN c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
<
p
p− 1
(
1
p
+
λ
N c
+
1 + q
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1).
Therefore,
ΦRi(s
i) <
(
1
p
+
1 + q + λ
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1). (7)
Observe that during the phase i − 1, the players in the block Ri ∩ Bi+1 have not deviated
from their initial strategy of BRu(0) in the state si−1. However, this cannot be guaranteed in
the state si where the players in Ri ∩ Bi+1 could have made their best-response q-moves. Now
in order to compare the potential amongst the players in Ri ∩ Bi in the state si−1 and si, it is
important that the players in Ri ∩ Bi+1 have the same strategy as it had in phase i − 1. So,
we construct the following thought experiment. Let sˆ be a state where player in Ri ∩ Bi play
their strategy in si and players u ∈ N \ (Ri ∩ Bi) play their strategy in si−1. Since, the cost
incurred by players in Ri∩Bi+1 in the state si after deviating to their strategy in si−1 is at most
Nλ∆bi+1.
The potential amongst the players in Ri in the state sˆ is given by,
ΦRi(sˆ) ≤ ΦRi∩Bi(si) +Nλ∆bi+1
≤ ΦRi(si) +Nλ∆bi+1. (8)
Using Lemma 10 we get,
ΦRi∩Bi(sˆ) ≤ ΦRi(sˆ)
Applying inequality (8) we get,
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≤ ΦRi(si) +Nλ∆bi+1
Then from inequality (5) and (7),
<
(
1
p
+
1 + q + 2λ
N c
)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1)
=
1
θ(q)
ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1).
The last equality follows from the definition of p in Algorithm 1.
If s∗ were to be the state in which the game attained its global minimum, then the last
inequality effectively means that the potential amongst the players in Ri ∩ Bi in state s∗ i.e.,
ΦRi(s
∗) is strictly smaller than 1
θ(q)ΦRi∩Bi(s
i−1) which violates the claim in Lemma 8 to conclude
that players in Ri∩Bi are not in a q-equilibrium at the end of the phase i−1. Hence, contradicting
our assumption.
To analyze convergence, we have to take into account the fact that players use different latency
functions and, hence, convergence is no longer guaranteed by Rosenthal’s potential function.
However, it turns out that the Rosenthal potential with respect to the modified cost functions
can serve as an approximate potential function, i.e., it also decreases for the p-moves of players
using the original cost functions.
Lemma 13 The Rosenthal potential φ˜ with respect to the modified cost functions f ′ is a p-
approximate potential function with respect to the original cost function f . That is,
cu(s
′
u, s−u) <
1
p
cu(s) implies φ˜(s
′
u, s−u) < φ˜(s),
where,
φ˜(s) :=
∑
e∈E
φ˜e(ne(s)) =
∑
e∈E
ne(s)∑
i=1
f ′e(i).
Proof: To simplify notation let ne := ne(s). From Lemma 7 we know that,
φ˜e(ne + 1)− φ˜e(ne) = f ′(ne + 1) ≤ λf(ne + 1),
and
f ′(ne + 1) ≥ f(ne + 1).
Therefore,
1 ≤ φ˜e(ne + 1)− φ˜e(ne)
fe(ne + 1)
≤ λ.
Using the above inequalities, the change in potential function φ˜ due to player u making a
p-move with respect to f , i.e.,
φ˜e(s
′
u, s−u)− φ˜e(s) =
∑
e∈E
φ˜e(s
′
u, s−u)− φ˜e(s)
=
∑
e∈s′u\su
φ˜e(ne + 1)− φ˜e(ne) +
∑
e∈su\s′u
φ˜e(ne − 1)− φ˜e(ne)
≤
∑
e∈s′u\su
λ · fe(ne + 1)−
∑
e∈su\s′u
fe(ne)
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≤ λ
 ∑
e∈s′u\su
fe(ne + 1) +
∑
e∈s′u∩su
fe(ne)

−
 ∑
e∈su\s′u
fe(ne) +
∑
e∈s′u∩su
fe(ne)

= λ · cu(s′u, s−u)− cu(s)
≤ p · cu(s′u, s−u)− cu(s).
The last inequality is due to the choice of p in Algorithm 1 such that it is slightly larger than λ.
The following lemma exhibits a even stronger property. It shows that p-moves with respect
to the original cost functions are q-moves with respect to the modified cost functions.
Lemma 14 Let u ∈ N be a player that makes a p-move with respect to the original cost function
f . Then,
p · cu(s′u, s−u)− cu(s) ≥ q · c′u(s′u, s−u)− c′u(s),
where cu, and c
′
u are the cost of the player u with respect to f and f
′, respectively.
Proof: Let us recall the definition of p, q, and θ(q) in Algorithm 1,
p :=
(
1
θ(q)
− 1 + 2λ+ q
N c
)−1
q :=
(
1 +
1
N c
)
θ(q) :=
λ
1 + 1−q
q
Nλ
Observe that p ≥ θ(q). Therefore,
p · cu(s′u, s−u)− cu(s) ≥ θ(q) · cu(s′u, s−u)− cu(s)
=
λ
1 + 1−q
q
Nλ
· cu(s′u, s−u)− cu(s)
=
qλ
1 + 1
Nc
(1 −Nλ) · cu(s
′
u, s−u)− cu(s)
≥ qλ · cu(s′u, s−u)− cu(s).
Then, from Lemma 7 we have that,
p · cu(s′u, s−u)− cu(s) ≥ q · c′u(s′u, s−u)− c′u(s).
Using Lemma 12 and 14, we can bound the runtime which depends on ∆ to allow for arbitrary
non-decreasing functions.
Lemma 15 The algorithm terminates after at most O(λ∆3N5c+5) best-response moves.
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Proof: The proof follows from Lemma 13 and Lemma 14. Again, we denote f ′ to be the
modified cost functions and f to be the original cost functions.
Let us recall that the algorithm partitions the sequence of best-response moves in the game
into zˆ − 1 phases, where zˆ = 1 + ⌈log2∆n2c+2 (ℓmax/ℓmin)⌉ ≤ N . In a phase i ∈ {1, . . . , zˆ − 1},
players in block Ri ∩ Bi make their p-move with respect to f and players in block Ri ∩ Bi+1
make their q-move with respect to f ′. We will bound the number of p-moves and q-moves in
any given phase i, using the potential function with respect to the modified cost function f ′.
Lemma 13 shows that when players in the block Bi make their p-moves, they also reduce the
potential function with respect to the modified cost functions f ′. Lemma 14 shows that the
change in cost of a player due to a p-move with respect to the function f is at least the change in
cost due to a q-move with respect to f ′. Therefore, in order to bound total number of moves in
any given phase i, it is sufficient to assume that players in block Bi make q-moves with respect
to f ′ instead of p-moves.
Using these we now bound the maximum number of best response moves in a phase,
Phase i = 1:
Let us assume that all players in the phase R1 have a q-move.
Define,
∆′ = max
e∈E,n∈N
f ′e(n)
fe(1)
≤ max
e∈E,n∈N
λ · fe(n)
fe(1)
,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 7. Then, for any player u ∈ R1, the maximum
latency incurred by the player at the beginning of phase with respect to f ′ is at most ∆′ · b1.
Observe that the maximum potential associated with the sub-game in the phase R1 with respect
to the modified cost function f ′ is then at most N∆′b1.
Also, the minimum latency experienced by the players in R1 is at least b3. So, when a player
in u ∈ R1 makes a best-response move, he must reduce the potential by at least (q− 1)b3. Then,
using the fact that bi = 2∆N
2c+2bi+1, we obtain the number of best response moves amongst
the players in R1 to be at most,
N∆′b1
(q − 1)b3 =
N∆′
(
4∆2N5c+4
)
N c(q − 1) ≤ 4λ∆
3N5c+5. (9)
Phase i ≥ 2: Again, let us assume that all players in the Ri have a q-move. Lemma 12 shows
that for each phase i ≥ 2, the potential amongst the players Ri participating in the phase i at
the beginning of the phase i.e., ΦRi(s
i−1) is at most bi
Nc
.
Therefore, due to Lemma 7 the potential with respect to the modified cost function is then
at most λ·bi
Nc
. By the definition of blocks the minimum latency that a player would incur is at
least bi+2. So, when a player u makes his best-response move during phase i, he would reduce
the potential of the sub-game and thus the players in Ri by at least (q−1)bi+2. Hence, using the
fact that bi = 2∆N
2c+2bi+1, we obtain the number of best response moves amongst the players
in Ri to be at most,
λ · bi
N c(q − 1)bi+2 =
λ
(
4∆2N4c+4
)
N c(q − 1) ≤ 4λ∆
2N4c+4. (10)
From (9) and (10) we get the desired upper bound on the number of best-response moves in the
game to be at most O(λ∆3N5c+5).
The next lemma shows that when players involved in phases i ≥ 2 make their moves, they do
not increase the cost of players in the blocks B1, B2, · · · , Bi−1 significantly.
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Lemma 16 Let u be a player that takes part in the phase t ≤ i, then it holds that,
cu(s
i+1) ≤ cu(si) + bi+1
N c
+Nλ∆bi+2.
Proof: We derive the proof by showing that if the increase in cost is greater than bi+1
Nc
+
Nλ∆bi+2, then it violates the fact that ΦRi+1(s
i) ≤ bi+1
Nc
.
Now, let us assume that ∃u ∈ Bi for whom the claim does not hold i.e.,
cu(s
i+1) > cu(s
i) +
bi+1
N c
+Nλ∆bi+2. (11)
This implies that there exists a set of resources C ⊆ su such that for each e ∈ C it is used by at
least one player in Ri+1 in the state s
i+1, thus contributing to the increase in cost of the player
u. Then from (11) we have, ∑
e∈C
fe(ne(s
i+1)) >
bi+1
N c
+Nλ∆bi+2.
Then,
ΦRi+1(s
i+1) >
bi+1
N c
+Nλ∆bi+2.
As the players in Ri+1∩Bi+2 might have increased (or decreased) ΦRi+1 by at most Nλ∆bi+2
and the players Ri+1 \Bi+2 only decreased the potential, we know that
ΦRi+1(s
i) ≥ ΦRi+1(si+1)−Nλ∆bi+2
>
bi+1
N c
+Nλ∆bi+2 −Nλ∆bi+2
=
bi+1
N c
The last inequality violates Lemma 12. Hence, this contradicts our assumption and thus the
claim holds for the player u.
Lemma 17 (Caragiannis et al. [9]) Let u be a player that takes part in the phase t ≤ i of the
congestion game G and let s′u be any strategy other than the one assigned by the algorithm during
the phase t of the game, then it holds that,
cu(s
′
u, s
i
−u) ≤ cu(s′u, si+1−u ) +
bi+1
N c
.
Proof: Assume the claim does not hold for some player u i.e.,
cu(s
′
u, s
i
−u) > cu(s
′
u, s
i+1
−u ) +
bi+1
N c
.
This means that during the phase i, there exists a subset of resources C ⊆ s′u such that for each
e ∈ C, ∃u′ ∈ Ri+1 who used the resource e in the state si but not in si+1 and thus contributed
to cost incurred by the player u during the phase i in the state si. Giving,∑
e∈C
fe(ne(s
′
u, s
i
−u)) >
bi+1
N c
.
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Furthermore, the cost of these resources yield a lower bound on the potential at the beginning
of the phase:
ΦRi+1(s
i) ≥
∑
e∈C
fe(ne(s
′
u, s
i
−u))
>
bi+1
N c
.
The last inequality violates Lemma 12. Hence, this contradicts our assumption and thus the
claim holds.
Lemma 18 Let u be a player in the block Bt, where t ≤ zˆ−2. Let s′u be a strategy different from
the one assigned to u by the algorithm at the end of the phase t. Then, for each phase i ≥ t, it
holds that, cu(s
i) ≤ p · cu(s′u, si−u) + 2p+1Nc
∑i
k=t+1 bk.
Proof: For the proof we use Lemma 16 recursively to obtain the first inequality. The second
inequality follows from the fact that there was no improving p-move to s′u for the player phase t
to s′u. The third inequality follows from Lemma 17. The fourth inequality from the definition of
bi.
cu(s
i) ≤ cu(st) +
i∑
k=t+1
(
bk
N c
+Nλ∆bk+1
)
≤ p · cu(s′u, st−u) +
i∑
k=t+1
(
bk
N c
+Nλ∆bk+1
)
≤ p
(
cu(s
′
u, s
i
−u) +
i∑
k=t+1
bk
N c
)
+
i∑
k=t+1
(
bk
N c
+Nλ∆bk+1
)
≤ p
(
cu(s
′
u, s
i
−u) +
i∑
k=t+1
bk
N c
)
+
i∑
k=t+1
(
bk
N c
+
λ
2N2c+1
bk
)
≤ p · cu(s′u, si−u) + (2p+ 1)
i∑
k=t+1
bk
N c
.
As no players’ costs and alternatives is significantly influenced by moves in later blocks, they
remain in an approximate equilibrium which can be used to finally prove the correctness of the
algorithm.
Lemma 19 The state computed by the algorithm is a p
(
1 + 5
Nc
)
-approximate equilibrium.
Proof: The idea behind the lemma is to show that after a player u ∈ Bi has made his final
best-response move during a phase i, he would be in a p
(
1 + 5
Nc
)
-approximate equilibrium at
the end of the game i.e., cost incurred by him after the final phase of the game is, cu(s
zˆ−1) ≤
p
(
1 + 5
Nc
)
cu(s
′
u, s
zˆ−1
−u ), where s
′
u is any strategy. Now, for players participating in the last phase
zˆ − 1 of the game i.e., u ∈ (Bzˆ−1 ∪ Bzˆ), observe that at the end of the phase zˆ − 1, players in
block Bzˆ−1 are in a p-approximate equilibrium and players in the block Bzˆ are in a q-approximate
equilibrium with respect to the modified cost function f ′. Furthermore, due to Lemma 14 players
in the block Bzˆ are also in a p-approximate equilibrium with respect to the original cost function
f . Therefore, the lemma holds for players in u ∈ (Bzˆ−1 ∪Bzˆ).
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It is now left to show that for the players u ∈ Bt where 1 ≤ t ≤ zˆ − 2, after the final phase of
the game,
cu(s
zˆ−1) ≤ p
(
1 +
5
N c
)
cu(s
′
u, s
zˆ−1
−u ).
By the definition of assignment of the players to blocks and the observation that the cost of
a player cannot be less than the ℓu , it holds that for any player u ∈ Bt after the final phase of
the game,
cu(s
′
u, s
zˆ−1
−u ) ≥ bt+1. (12)
By the definition of bi, we have,
zˆ∑
k=t+1
bk ≤ 2bt+1. (13)
Using inequalities (12), (13), and Lemma 18 we get for p ≥ 1,
cu(s
zˆ−1) ≤ p · cu(s′u, szˆ−1−u ) + (2p+ 1)
zˆ−1∑
k=t+1
bk
N c
≤ p · cu(s′u, szˆ−1−u ) +
2(2p+ 1)
N c
cu(s
′
u, s
zˆ−1
−u )
≤ p
(
1 +
5
N c
)
cu(s
′
u, s
zˆ−1
−u ).
Lemmas 15 and 19 conclude the proof of the Theorem 6 to show that for
q =
(
1 +
1
N c
)
and
p =
(
1
θ (q)
− 1 + 2λ+ q
N c
)−1
the algorithm computes a α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium in polynomial time, where
α ≤
(
1
θ(q)
− 1 + 2λ+ q
N c
)−1(
1 +
5
N c
)
=
1(
1− Nλ
Nc+1
λ
− 1+2λ+q
Nc
) (1 + 5
N c
)
=
λ(
1− Nλ
Nc+1 − λ(1+2λ+q)Nc
) (1 + 5
N c
)
≤ λ(
1− Nλ
Nc+1 − λ(2λ+3)Nc
) (1 + 5
N c
)
,
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choosing c = 10 log
(
λ
ǫ
)
we can easily bound
λ(
1− Nλ
Nc+1 − λ(2λ+3)Nc
) (1 + 5
N c
)
≤ λ(
1− ǫ5 − ǫ5
) (1 + ǫ
5
)
≤ λ(1 + ǫ).
This concludes the proof of correctness for Algorithm 1.
3.2 Improving the Approximation Factor
In Section 3.1 we proved that given a set of cost functions f ′ satisfying the strong smoothness
condition of Lemma 5 for some λ > 0, Algorithm 1 computes a λ(1 + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash
equilibrium. We now study how one could optimally choose the modified cost functions f ′ such
that value of λ is minimized. Observe that from Lemma 5, for any resource e ∈ E, the modified
cost functions f ′e can be computed using a linear program. That is, for a objective function φe
and a bound on the number of players N , finding functions f ′e that minimize λ, can be easily
solved by the following linear program LPφ with the variables f
′
e(1), . . . , f
′
e(N), and λe.
minλe
λe ·
m+z∑
i=z+1
fe(i)−mf ′e(n+ z + 1) + nf ′e(n+ z) ≥
n+z∑
i=z+1
fe(i) ∀(n+ z),m ∈ [0, N ]
f ′e(n) ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [0, N + 1]
Choosing the output of the linear program LPφ as the modified cost functions f
′ and setting
value of λ := maxe∈E λe in Algorithm 1, results in λ(1 + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Observe that LPφ is compact, i.e., the number of constraints and variables are polynomially
bounded in the number of players. Hence, we state the following theorem.
Theorem 20 Optimal resource cost functions f ′e for objective functions φe can be computed in
polynomial time.
Linear and Polynomial Cost Functions
Observe that Theorem 6 holds for all congestion games with arbitrary non-decreasing cost
functions. We now turn to the important class of polynomial cost functions with non-negative
coefficients. We can use a standard trick to simplify the analysis for resources with polynomial
cost functions of the form fe(x) =
∑d
i=0 aix
d by replacing such resources by d + 1 resources
with cost functions a0, a1x, . . . , adx
d and adjust the strategy sets accordingly. Hence, by an
additional scaling argument it suffices to only consider cost functions of the form fe(x) = x
i and
i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Furthermore, we can show that for polynomials of small degree, it is sufficient to restrict the
attention to the first K = 150 values of the cost functions. Hence, we only need to solve a linear
program of constant size. The following lemma states that for the larger values of n, appropriate
values of λd, and ν, we can easily obtain (λd, 0)-smoothness by choosing f
′(n) = νnd.
Lemma 21 For d ≤ 5 and n ≥ 150, the function f ′(n) = νnd with ν = d+1√λd is strong
(λd, 0)-smooth with respect to the potential function φ for an appropriate λd.
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Proof: For each degree d and its associated value of λd = ρd (Table 1), we need to show that
there exist a ν such that for the smoothness condition in Lemma 5, the following holds for all
x ≥ 150,
λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −m · ν · (x+ 1)d + (x− z) · ν · xd −
x∑
i=z+1
id ≥ 0.
For all λd > 0,
λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −m · ν · (x+ 1)d + (x − z) · ν · xd −
x∑
i=z+1
id
≥ λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −m · ν · (x+ 1)d + (x− z) · ν · xd −
∫ x+1
z+1
tddt
≥ λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −m · ν · (x+ 1)d + (x− z) · ν · xd − (x+ 1)
d+1
d+ 1
+
(z + 1)d+1
d+ 1
= λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −m · ν · (x+ 1)d + ν · xd+1 − ν · z · xd − (x+ 1)
d+1
d+ 1
+
(z + 1)d+1
d+ 1
≥ λd
∫ m+z
z+1
tddt−m · ν · (x+ 1)d + ν · xd+1 − ν · z · xd − (x+ 1)
d+1
d+ 1
+
(z + 1)d+1
d+ 1
= λd
(m+ z)d+1
d+ 1
− λd (z + 1)
d+1
d+ 1
−m · ν · (x+ 1)d + ν · xd+1 − ν · z · xd − (x + 1)
d+1
d+ 1
+
(z + 1)d+1
d+ 1
The above expression is minimized for,
m =
d
√
ν · (x+ 1)d
λd
− z.
Substituting for m we obtain,
≥ λd
(
d
√
ν·(x+1)d
λd
)d+1
d+ 1
− (λd − 1)(z + 1)
d+1
d+ 1
−
 d√ν · (x+ 1)d
λd
− z
 · ν · (x + 1)d
+ ν · xd+1 − ν · z · xd − (x+ 1)
d+1
d+ 1
= λd
(
d
√
ν·(x+1)d
λd
)d+1
d+ 1
− (λd − 1)(z + 1)
d+1
d+ 1
− d
√
ν · (x + 1)d
λd
· ν · (x+ 1)d + z · ν · (x+ 1)d
+ ν · xd+1 − ν · z · xd − (x+ 1)
d+1
d+ 1
= (x + 1)d+1
((
1
d+ 1
− 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
λd
− 1
d+ 1
)
−
(
(λd − 1)(z + 1)
d+1
d+ 1
− z · ν ((x+ 1)d − xd))
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+ ν · xd+1.
The above expression is minimized for,
z =
d
√
ν((x+ 1)d − xd)
λd − 1 − 1.
Substituting for z we get,
≥ (x+ 1)d+1
((
1
d+ 1
− 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
λd
− 1
d+ 1
)
−
(
1
d+ 1
− 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
λd − 1
(
(x + 1)d − xd) d+1d
+ ν · xd+1 − ν ((x+ 1)d − xd)
For any ν ≥ 0 the above expression is,
≥ (x+ 1)d+1
((
1
d+ 1
− 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
λd
− 1
d+ 1
)
+ ν
(
xd+1 − (x+ 1)d + xd)
Now, what is left to show is that there exists a ν ≥ 0 such that,
(x+ 1)d+1
((
1
d+ 1
− 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
λd
− 1
d+ 1
)
+ ν
(
xd+1 − (x+ 1)d + xd) ≥ 0
equivalent to,
ν
(
xd+1 − (x+ 1)d + xd) ≥ (x+ 1)d+1((1− 1
d+ 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
λd
+
1
d+ 1
)
(14)
For ν = d+1
√
λd and ∀x ∈ N such that,
(x+ 1)d+1
(xd+1 − (x+ 1)d + xd) ≤
d+1
√
λd,
the inequality (14) holds. From the fact that,
lim
x→∞
(x + 1)d+1
(xd+1 − (x + 1)d + xd) = 1,
and choice of λd = ρd (Table 1), gives for 0 < d ≤ 5, that x ≥ 150 is sufficient.
We further note, that for a given λd > 0, for each n and z, we only need to consider a limited
range for m.
Lemma 22 For fixed n, z, if λd ·
∑m+z
i=z+1 i
d −mf ′(n+ z + 1) + nf ′(n+ z) ≥∑n+zi=z+1 id is true
∀m ≤ (n+ z + 1)2(d+ 1), it also holds ∀m > (n+ z + 1)2(d+ 1).
Proof: For any given n, z ∈ N, and λd > 0, we show for all m ≥ (n+ z + 1)2(d+ 1) that,
λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −mf ′(n+ z + 1) + nf ′(n+ z)−
n+z∑
i=z+1
id ≥ 0.
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We first upper bound the feasible values for f ′. From the smoothness condition in Lemma 5,
observe that for n = z = 0 and m = 1 the inequality implies that f ′(1) ≤ λd. Furthermore, by
the choice of m = n, we get
f ′(n+ z + 1) ≤ (λd − 1)
n+z∑
i=1
1
i
i∑
j=1
jd
+ λd
≤ (λd − 1)
n+z∑
j=1
jd + λd
≤ (λd − 1)(n+ z)d+1 + λd
This gives,
λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −mf ′(n+ z + 1) + nf ′(n+ z)−
n+z∑
i=z+1
id
≥ λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −m ((λd − 1)(n+ z)d+1 + λd)+ nf ′(n+ z)− n+z∑
i=z+1
id
≥ λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −m ((λd − 1)(n+ z)d+1 + λd)− n+z∑
i=z+1
id
≥ λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id − λdm(n+ z)d+1 +m(n+ z)d+1 −mλd − (n+ z)d+1
= λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id − λdm(n+ z)d+1 + (m− 1)(n+ z)d+1 −mλd
≥ λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id − λdm(n+ z)d+1 −mλd
Now we can bound for m ≥ (d+ 1)(n+ z + 1)2.
λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id − λdm(n+ z)d+1 −mλd
= λd
m+z∑
i=z+1
id − λdm((n+ z)d+1 + 1)
≥ λdm(m+ z)
d
d+ 1
− λdm((n+ z)d+1 + 1)
≥ λdm
d+1
d+ 1
− λdm((n+ z)d+1 + 1)
≥ 0.
By Lemma 21 and 22 it remains to solve the following linear program LPKφ to obtain our
results ρd as listed in Table 1 for d ≤ 5.
min ρd
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ρd ·
m+z∑
i=z+1
id −mf ′(n+ z + 1) + nf ′(n+ z) ≥
n+z∑
i=z+1
id ∀(n+ z) ∈ [0,K),
∀m ∈ [0, (K + 1)2(d+ 1)]
f ′(K) ≤ νKd
f ′(n) ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [0,K]
Corollary 23 For every congestion game with polynomial cost functions of degree d ≤ 5 and for
every constant ǫ > 0, the algorithm computes a (ρd + ǫ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium in
polynomial time.
4 Load Dependent Universal Taxes
We now look at an extension of Lemma 4 for computing load dependent universal taxes in
congestion games. We give a rather simple approach to locally (on resource) compute load
dependent universal taxes. Table 2 lists the improved PoA bounds under refundable taxation
using our technique for congestion games with resource cost functions that are bounded degree
polynomials of maximum degree d. By the smoothness argument (Theorem 297, [30]) the new
bounds immediately extends to mixed, (coarse) correlated equilibria, and outcome generated by
no-regret sequences. Moreover, since the linear program that computes the cost or tax function
does only depend on the original cost function of that resource, the computed taxes are robust
against perturbations of the instance such as adding or removing of resources or players.
We seek to compute universal load dependent taxes that minimize the PoA under refundable
taxation. We consider the following optimization problem. For an objective function h(s) =∑
e∈E ne(s) · fe(ne(s)), find functions f ′e that satisfies Lemma 4 minimizing λ. For a resource
objective function he(ne(s)) = ne(s) · fe(ne(s)) and a bound on the number of players N , this
can be easily solved by the following linear program LPsc with the variables f
′
e(1), . . . , f
′
e(N),
and λe.
minλe
λe · he(m)−mf ′e(n+ 1) + nf ′e(n) ≥ he(n) for all n ∈ [0, N ],m ∈ [0, N ]
f ′e(n) ≥ 0 for all n ∈ [0, N ]
Observe that, we can solve LPsc locally for each resource with cost function fe. For the LP
solution λe and f
′
e(n), define the tax function as te(n) := f
′
e(n) − fe(n). The resulting price of
anarchy under taxation is then λ := maxe∈E λe.
For any (distributed) local search algorithm (such as Bjelde et al. [8]) that seeks to minimize
the social cost c(s) =
∑
e∈E ne(s)fe(ne(s)), we define ζsc(s) :=
∑
e∈E
∑ne(s)
i=1 f
′
e(i) as a pseudo-
potential function. Then, from Lemma 4 it is guaranteed that every local optimum with respect
to ζsc(s) has an approximation factor of at most λ := maxe∈E λe with respect to the social cost
c(s). Using approximate local search by Orlin et al. [25], we can compute a solution close to that
in polynomial time and more so to state the following.
Corollary 24 For every congestion game the ǫ-local search algorithm using ζsc(s), produces a
λ(1 + ǫ) local optimum in running time polynomial in the input length, and 1/ǫ.
7 See appendix A.
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Linear and Polynomial Cost Functions
For the interesting case of polynomial resource cost functions of maximum degree d, similar
to Section 3, we show that for polynomials of small degree, it is sufficient to restrict the attention
to the first K = 1154 values of the cost functions. Hence, we only need solve a linear program
of constant size. The following lemma states that for the values of n greater than K and an
appropriate value of ν, and λd, we can easily obtain (λd, 0)-smoothness by choosing f
′(n) = νnd.
Lemma 25 For d ≤ 5 and n ≥ 1154, the function f ′(n) = νnd with ν = d+1√(d+ 1)λd is
(λd, 0)-smooth with respect to h(n) = n
d+1 and an appropriate λd.
Proof: For each degree d and an appropriate value of λd = Ψd (Table 2), we need to show that
there exist a ν such that the the smoothness condition in Lemma 4 holds for all n ≥ 1154, i.e.,
λdm
d+1 −mν(n+ 1)d + nνnd − nd+1 ≥ 0.
For all λd > 0,
λdm
d+1 −mν(n+ 1)d + nνnd − nd+1
= λdm
d+1 −mν(n+ 1)d + nd+1(ν − 1).
The above expression is minimized at,
m = d
√
ν(n+ 1)d
(d + 1)λd
.
Substituting for m gives,
= λd
(
d
√
ν(n+ 1)d
(d+ 1)λd
)d+1
−
(
d
√
ν(n+ 1)d
(d+ 1)λd
)
ν(n+ 1)d + nd+1(ν − 1)
=
(
1
d+ 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
(d+ 1)λd
(n+ 1)d+1 − ν
d+1
d
d
√
(d+ 1)λd
(n+ 1)d+1 + nd+1(ν − 1)
=
(
1
d+ 1
− 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
(d+ 1)λd
(n+ 1)d+1 + nd+1(ν − 1)
We need to show that there exists a ν ≥ 0 such that,(
1
d+ 1
− 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
(d+ 1)λd
(n+ 1)d+1 + nd+1(ν − 1) ≥ 0
equivalent to,
nd+1(ν − 1) ≥
(
1− 1
d+ 1
)
ν
d+1
d
d
√
(d+ 1)λd
(n+ 1)d+1 (15)
For ν = d+1
√
(d+ 1)λd and ∀n ∈ N such that,
(n+ 1)d+1
nd+1
(
1− 1
d+ 1
)
≤
(
d+1
√
(d+ 1)λd − 1
)
,
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the inequality (15) holds. Also, using the fact that,
lim
n→∞
(n+ 1)d+1
nd+1
= 1,
and choice of λd = Ψd (Table 2), gives for 0 < d ≤ 5, that n ≥ 1154 is sufficient.
We further note, that for a fixed λd > 0 and for each n, we only need to consider a limited
range for m in the LPsc.
Lemma 26 For a fixed n, if λd ·md+1−mf(n+1)+nf(n)≥ nd+1 is true for all m ≤ (n+1)2,
it also holds for all m > (n+ 1)2.
Proof: For any given n ∈ N and λd > 0, we show for all m ≥ (n+ 1)2 that,
λdm
d+1 −mf ′(n+ 1) + nf ′(n)−
n∑
i=1
nd+1 ≥ 0.
We first upper bound the feasible values for f ′(n). From the smoothness condition in
Lemma 4, note that for n = 0 and m = 1, implies that f ′(1) ≤ λd. Furthermore, by the
choice of m = n, we get f ′(n + 1) ≤ f ′(n) + λd−1
n
nd+1. By recursion, we obtain f ′(n + 1) ≤
(λd − 1)
∑n
i=1 i
d + λd which we can simply bound by f
′(n+ 1) ≤ (λd − 1) · nd+1 + λd. Now we
can bound for m ≥ (n+ 1)2.
λdm
d+1 −mf ′(n+ 1) + nf ′(n)− nd+1
≥ λdmd+1 −m
(
(λd − 1)nd+1 + λd
)− nd+1
= λdm
d+1 −mλdnd+1 +mnd+1 −mλd − nd+1
≥ λdmd+1 −mλdnd+1 −mλd
≥ 0
As a consequence of Lemma 25 and 26 it only remains to solve the following linear program
of constant size for each d ≤ 5 to obtain our results Ψd (listed in Table 2). Our results match
the recent results that were obtained independently by Paccagnan et al. [26].
minΨd
Ψdm
d+1 −mf ′(n+ 1) + nf ′(n) ≥ nd+1 ∀n ∈ [0,K),m ∈ [0, (K + 1)2]
f ′(K) ≤ νKd
f ′(n) ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [0,K]
Corollary 27 For every congestion game with polynomial cost functions of degree d ≤ 5, each
cost function f ′e can be computed in constant time and the resulting game is (Ψd, 0)-smooth with
respect to social cost.
Lower Bound
Any feasible solution to the linear program LPh emerging from Lemma 4 are cost functions
f ′e : N 7→ R+ that guarantees that the objective value associated with the function h is at most
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λ := maxe∈E λe. We can show that this is in fact optimal. That is, LPh is not only optimizing
the smoothness inequality, but also that there exists no other resource cost function that can
guarantee a smaller objective value than λ. To that end, we consider the dual of LPh and show
that for every feasible solution of the dual, we can construct an instance of a selfish scheduling
game with an objective value that is equal to the value of the dual LP solution, regardless of the
actual cost function of the game.
We construct a selfish scheduling game with identical machines. This is a congestion game in
which players’ strategies are singletons. Furthermore, each resource has the same cost function
and hence, players only seek to choose a resource with minimal load. Obviously, every equilibrium
in the scheduling game is an equilibrium in a congestion game in which the resource cost function
is an arbitrary non-decreasing function. The dual program LPDh is as follows,
max
N∑
n=0
N∑
m=0
h(n) · yn,m (16)
N∑
n=0
N∑
m=0
h(m) · yn,m ≤ 1 (17)
N∑
m=0
n · yn,m −
N∑
m=0
m · yn−1,m ≤ 0 for all n ∈ [0, N ]
yn,m ≥ 0 for all n,m ∈ [0, N ]
Lemma 28 Every optimal solution of LPDh with objective value λ can be turned into an instance
of selfish scheduling on identical machines with an objective value of λ− ǫ for an arbitrary ǫ > 0.
Proof: Let y˜ be a feasible solution to LPDh with λ =
∑N
n=0
∑N
m=0 h(n) · y˜n,m. We round down
each y˜n,m to rational numbers yn,m ≥ (1− ǫλ)y˜n,m and let M be a sufficiently large scaling factor
such that each yn,m ·M is an integer. We construct a congestion game as follows. The game
G = (N , R, {Su}u∈N , {cr}r∈R) consist of a set of players N =
⋃
n∈[0,N ]Nn, where each set Nn
consists of n ·∑Nm=0 yn,m ·M many players. The set of resources is R = ⋃n∈[0,N ],m∈[0,N ]Rn,m,
where Rn,m represents a pool consisting of yn,m ·M identical machines.
We will make sure that in the game G, there is an equilibrium s∗ in which on each machine
in each set Rn,m there are exactly n many players. Hence, using (16) the total cost over all
resources in s∗ is
∑N
n=0
∑N
m=0 h(n) · yn,m ·M ≥ λ(1 − ǫ)M . Additionally, there is a state s in
which on each machine in each set Rn,m there are exactly m many players. Hence, using (17)
the total cost over all resources in s is
∑N
n=0
∑N
m=0 h(m) · yn,m ·M ≤M .
Each player from a set Nn in the game has two strategies, which we call an equilibrium
strategy and an optimal strategy. The equilibrium strategy consists of one particular resource
r ∈ ⋃m∈[0,N ]Rn,m and the optimal strategy of a particular resource r ∈ ⋃m∈[0,N ]Rn−1,m. The
assignment of resources to strategies is such that each resource r ∈ Rn,m belongs to exactly n
equilibrium strategies of players from Nn and at most m optimal strategies of players from Nn+1.
Note that the existence of such an assignment is guaranteed by the feasibility of y and hence,∑N
m=0 n · yn,m ≤
∑N
m=0m · yn−1,m. If each player chooses the equilibrium strategy, we obtain a
state s∗ as described above which is a pure Nash equilibrium as switching to the optimal strategy
yields exactly the same load. If each player chooses the optimal strategy we obtain a state s as
described above. Therefore, the objective value is at least λ− ǫ.
From Lemma 28 we remark that the taxes computed by LPsc are optimal. Evidently our lower
bound of 2.012 for congestion games with linear cost functions matches the price of anarchy bound
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for selfish scheduling games on identical machines [10].
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
The most interesting question which was the initial motivation for this work is the complexity
of approximate equilibria. We find it very surprising that the technique yields such a significant
improvement, e.g., for linear congestion games from 2 to 1.61, by using essentially the same
algorithm of Caragiannis et al. [9].
However, the algorithmic technique is limited only by the lower bound for approximation
factor of the stretch implied in Roughgarden [31]. Hence, further significant improvements may
need new algorithmic ideas. On the lower bound side, not much is known for linear or polyno-
mial congestion games. The only computational lower bound for approximate equilibria is from
Skopalik and Vo¨cking [33] using unnatural and very steep cost functions.
We believe that the technique of perturbing the instance of an (optimization) problem such
that a simple local search heuristic (or an equilibrium) guarantees an improved approximation
ratio can be applied in other settings as well. It would be interesting to see, whether one can
achieve similar results for variants and generalizations of congestion games such as weighted [3],
atomic- or integer-splittable [27, 32] congestion games, scheduling games [15, 20, 14], etc. Con-
sidering other heuristics such as greedy or one-round walks [13, 5, 21, 7] would be another natural
direction.
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A Appendix
Missing proofs of Section 2
Proof of Theorem 2: Let s be an arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium and s∗ be the optimal
solution. From the Nash inequality we know,
∀u ∈ N , cu(s) ≤ cu(s∗u, s−u).
Then, summing over all the N players gives,∑
u∈N
cu(s)−
∑
u∈N
cu(s
∗
u, s−u) ≤ 0.
By the definition of (λ, µ) smoothness in Definition 1 we have,
(1− µ) · h(s) ≤ λ · h(s∗) +
∑
u∈N
cu(s)−
∑
u∈N
cu(s
∗
u, s−u)
From the Nash inequality the theorem follows.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let s and s∗ be arbitrary solutions. Summing the inequality of the lemma
with m = ne(s
∗) and n = ne(s) for all e ∈ E gives,
λ
∑
e∈E
he(ne(s
∗) ≥
∑
e∈E
ne(s
∗)f ′e(ne(s) + 1)−
∑
e∈E
ne(s)f
′
e(ne(s)) +
∑
e∈E
he(ne(s))
λ · h(s∗) ≥
∑
u∈N
c′u(s
∗
u, s−u)−
∑
u∈N
c′u(s) + h(s)
which is the (λ, 0)-smoothness condition of Definition 1.
Proof of Lemma 5: The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4. Consider an arbitrary
subset of players F ⊆ N , an arbitrary state s, and a subgame GFs := (F,E, (Su)u∈F , (fFe )e∈E)
induced by freezing the remaining players from N \ F , that is, let fFe (x) := fe(x + nN\Fe (s))
where n
N\F
e (s) is the number of players outside of F on resource e in the state s. Let s∗ be an
arbitrary solution. Summing the inequality of the lemma with m = nFe (s
∗) and n = nFe (s) for
all e ∈ E gives,
λ
∑
e∈E
φFe (ne(s
∗) ≥
∑
e∈E
nFe (s
∗)f ′e(ne(s) + 1)−
∑
e∈E
nFe (s)f
′
e(ne(s)) +
∑
e∈E
φFe (ne(s))
equivalent to,
λ · φF (s∗) ≥
∑
u∈F
c′u(s
∗
u, s−u)−
∑
u∈F
c′u(s) + φ
F (s),
which is the (λ, 0)-smoothness condition of Definition 2.
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Theorem 29 (Extension Theorem) For every (λ, µ)-smooth cost-minimization game G with
respect to an arbitrary objective function h, every coarse correlated equilibrium σ, and every
outcome s∗,
Es∼σ[h(s)] ≤ λ
1− µ · h(s
∗).
Proof: The proof is analogous to Roughgarden’s proof [30]. From the (λ, µ)-smoothness
condition in Definition 1, we have,
Es∼σ [h(s)] ≤ 1
1− µEs∼σ
[
λ · h(s∗) +
∑
u∈N
cu(s)−
∑
u∈N
cu(s
∗
u, s−u)
]
=
1
1− µ
[
λ · h(s∗) +
∑
u∈N
Es∼σ [cu(s)]−
∑
u∈N
Es∼σ[cu(s
∗
u, s−u)]
]
From the definition of CCE,
≤ λ
1− µ · h(s
∗).
Hence, the theorem.
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